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STATE OF NEW YORK- BOARD OF PAROLE 
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE 
Name: Schultz, Darryl Facility: Orleans CF 
NYSID: 
DIN: 89-C-0018 
Appeal 
Control No.: 
09-100-18 B 
. Appearances: Cheryl Kates Esq. 
P.O. Box 734 
Fairport, New York 14450 
Decision appealed: September 2018 decision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 15 
months. · · 
Board Member(s) Alexander, Coppola 
who participated: 
Papers considered: Appellant's Letter-brief received January 25, 2019 
AppeaJs Unit Review: Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation 
Records relied upon: Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole 
BolJ.rd Release Decision Notice (Form 9026), COMP AS instrument, Offender Case 
Pl~. 
The undersigned determine that the decision appealed is hereby: 
;' / 
f::::::::z::~~~~~!2~rmed _Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to ___ _ 
~ed Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to----
_Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to ___ _ 
Commissioner 
If the Final Determination is. at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written 
reasons for the Parole Board's determination must be annexed hereto. 
This Final Dete~n~tion, the rela.ted Statement of the Appeals Unit's Finding~ and the se~ar e fl ding~o~ 
the Parole Board, 1f any, were mailed to the Inmate and the Inmate's Counsel, 1f any, on ? ~.J t;.'i '1)6. 
Distribution: Appeals Unit- Appellant - Appellant's Counsel - Inst. Parole File - Central File 
P~2002(B) (11/2018) 
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     Appellant challenges the September 2018 determination of the Board, denying release and 
imposing a 15-month hold. Appellant raises the following issues:  1) the decision is arbitrary and 
capricious, and irrational bordering on impropriety, in that the Board failed to consider and/or 
properly weigh all of the required statutory and regulatory factors. 2) the decision lacks details. 3) 
the Board was looking at non-statutory items such as an autopsy report. 4) the Board was engaging 
in prohibited Penal Law philosophy by comparing the terms for murder vs manslaughter. 5) the 
decision violated the due process clause of the constitution. 6) the decision violated the 8th 
amendment to the constitution. 7) the community opposition clearly has errors and penal 
philosophy in it, and was not turned over to the appellant. 8) the decision resentenced him to life 
without parole. 9) the decision punished appellant for invoking his 5th amendment right not to 
testify at trial. 10) the decision was predetermined. 11) factors discussed in more detail in prior 
interviews did not get the same in depth discussion at this interview. 12) the Board failed to comply 
with the 2011 amendments to the Executive Law, and the 2017 regulations, in that these are 
evidence based procedures that focus on rehabilitation. The Board ignored the COMPAS, and 
didn’t depart from it in a legal manner. 13) the 15 month hold is excessive. 
 
     Discretionary release to parole is not to be granted “merely as a reward for good conduct or 
efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable probability 
that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and that 
his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so deprecate the seriousness 
of his crime as to undermine respect for the law.”  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); 
accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 
(3d Dept. 2014).  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider criteria which is 
relevant to the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the inmate’s institutional record and 
criminal behavior.  People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 
N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983). While consideration of these factors is mandatory, “the ultimate 
decision to parole a prisoner is discretionary.”  Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 
718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000).  Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite 
factors is solely within the Board’s discretion.  See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 
1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d 
at 717; Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 
415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997).  The Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give 
them equal weight.  Matter of Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 
2017); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 
(2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st 
Dept. 2007). 
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     Although the Board placed emphasis on the crime (murder), the record reflects it also 
considered other appropriate factors and it was not required to place equal weight on each factor 
considered.  Matter of Peralta v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.3d 1151, 69 N.Y.S.3d 885 
(3d Dept. 2018). Although the Board placed emphasis on the crime, it was free to do so given all 
factors need not be given equal weight.  Matter of Arena v. New York State Dep’t of Corr. & 
Cmty. Supervision, 156 A.D.3d 1101, 65 N.Y.S.3d 471 (3d Dept. 2017). 
 
    The fact that the Board afforded greater weight to the inmate’s criminal history, as opposed to 
other positive factors, does not render the denial of parole for that reason irrational or improper.  
Matter of Davis v. Evans, 105 A.D.3d 1305, 963 N.Y.S.2d 485 (3d Dept. 2013); Matter of Lashway 
v. Evans, 110 A.D.3d 1417, 1418, 974 N.Y.S.2d 164, 165 (3d Dept. 2013); Matter of McKee v. New 
York State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204 (3d Dept. 1990).   
     That inmate’s prior criminal record and nature of offenses for which incarcerated resulted in 
parole denial does not reflect irrationality bordering on impropriety.  Matter of Singh v. Evans, 
118 A.D.3d 1209, 987 N.Y.S.2d 271 (3d Dept.), lv. denied, 24 N.Y.3d 906, 995 N.Y.S.2d 715 
(2014). 
 
    The Board may emphasize the nature of the instant offense and that it was an escalation in illegal 
behavior.  See Matter of Stanley v. New York State Div. of Parole, 92 A.D.3d 948, 948-49, 939 
N.Y.S.2d 132, 134 (2d Dept.), lv. denied, 19 N.Y.3d 806, 949 N.Y.S.2d 343 (2012); Matter of 
Symmonds v. Dennison, 21 A.D.3d 1171, 1172, 801 N.Y.S.2d 90, 90 (3d Dept.), lv. denied, 6 
N.Y.3d 701, 810 N.Y.S.2d 415 (2005); Matter of Warren v. New York State Div. of Parole, 307 
A.D.2d 493, 493, 761 N.Y.S.2d 883 (3d Dept. 2003); Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of 
Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239-40, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997).    
    T]here is a strong rehabilitative component in the statute that may be given effect by considering 
remorse. Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 478, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704 (2000).   
     The Board may cite the failure of the inmate to acknowledge the impact of the criminal conduct 
on the victim. Gaito v New York State Board of Parole, 238 A.D.2d 634, 655 N.Y.S.2d 692 (3d Dept 
1997);  Romer v Dennison, 24 A.D.3d 866, 804 N.Y.S.2d 872 (3d Dept. 2005).  The Board may 
consider the probable repercussions of the criminal’s actions upon the victims’ families. Bottom v 
New York State Board of Parole, 30 A.D.3d 657, 815 N.Y.S.2d 789  (3d Dept. 2006). 
     The Board’s decision satisfied the criteria set out in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a), as it was 
sufficiently detailed to inform the inmate of the reasons for the denial of parole.  Matter of Applegate 
v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of 
Kozlowski v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 108 A.D.3d 435, 968 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st Dept. 2013); 
Matter of Little v. Travis, 15 A.D.3d 698, 788 N.Y.S.2d 628 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of Davis v. 
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Travis, 292 A.D.2d 742, 739 N.Y.S.2d 300 (3d Dept. 2002); People ex rel. Herbert v. New York 
State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).   
    The record does not support appellant’s contention that the Board improperly took into account 
the inmate’s decision to go to trial. Cody v Dennison, 33 A.D.3d 1141, 822 N.Y.S.2d 677 (3d 
Dept. 2006), lv.den.8 N.Y.3d 802, 830 N.Y.S.2d 698. 
 
     There is no evidence the Board’s decision was predetermined based upon the instant offense.  
Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of 
Hakim-Zaki v. New York State Div. of Parole, 29 A.D.3d 1190, 814 N.Y.S.2d 414 (3d Dept. 2006); 
Matter of Guerin v. New York State Div. of Parole, 276 A.D.2d 899, 695 N.Y.S.2d 622 (3d Dept. 
2000). There is a presumption of honesty and integrity that attaches to Judges and administrative 
fact-finders.  See People ex rel. Carlo v. Bednosky, 294 A.D.2d 382, 383, 741 N.Y.S.2d 703 (2d 
Dept. 2002); People ex. rel. Johnson v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 180 A.D.2d 914, 916, 580 
N.Y.S.2d 957, 959 (3d Dept. 1992).  The Board is presumed to follow its statutory commands and 
internal policies in fulfilling its obligations.  See Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 256, 120 S. Ct. 1362, 
1371 (2000).   Appellant has failed to overcome the presumption that the Board complied with its 
duty.  See Matter of Davis v. New York State Div. of Parole, 114 A.D.2d 412, 494 N.Y.S.2d 136 
(2d Dept. 1985). There is no merit to the inmate’s contention that the parole interview was 
improperly conducted or that he was denied a fair interview. Black v New York State Board of 
Parole, 54 A.D.3d 1076, 863 N.Y.S.2d 521 (3d Dept. 2008); Rivers v Evans, 119 A.D.3d 1188, 
989 N.Y.S.2d 400 (3d Dept. 2014);  Mays v Stanford, 150 A.D.3d 1521, 55 N.Y.S.3d 502 (3d Dept. 
2017).     
 
     Credibility of an inmates explanation is to be made by the Board. The Board may consider other 
court decisions involving the inmate’s capacity to tell the truth, and how this impacts on the 
statutory factors. Siao-Pao v Dennison, 51 A.D.3d 105, 854 N.Y.S.2d 348 (1st Dept. 2008). Thus, 
the discussion about murder vs manslaughter had nothing at all to do with penal philosophy, but 
rather was the appellant telling the truth to the Board.   
    It is pure baseless speculation to contend the Board was referring to an autopsy report. 
     There is no legal requirement that a second Parole Board panel must follow the 
recommendation of a prior Parole Board panel. Flores v New York State Board of Parole, 210 
A.D.2d 555, 620 N.Y.S.2d 141, 142 (3d Dept 1994). 
     Appellant’s assertion that the denial of parole release amounted to an improper resentencing is 
without merit inasmuch as the Board fulfilled its obligation to determine the propriety of release 
per Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) and after considering the factors set forth therein.  Executive 
Law § 259 et seq.; Penal Law § 70.40; Matter of Murray v. Evans, 83 A.D.3d 1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 
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745 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Crews v. New York State Exec. Dept. Bd. of Parole Appeals Unit, 
281 A.D.2d 672, 720 N.Y.S.2d 855 (3d Dept. 2001).  The Board was vested with discretion to 
determine whether release was appropriate notwithstanding the minimum period of incarceration 
set by the Court.  Matter of Burress v. Dennison, 37 A.D.3d 930, 829 N.Y.S.2d 283 (3d Dept. 
2007); Matter of Cody v. Dennison, 33 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 822 N.Y.S.2d 677 (3d Dept. 2006), lv. 
denied, 8 N.Y.3d 802, 830 N.Y.S.2d 698 (2007).  The appellant has not in any manner been 
resentenced.  Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 25 
N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016). The Board was vested with discretion to determine whether release 
was appropriate notwithstanding the minimum period of incarceration set by the Court, Matter of 
Burress v. Dennison, 37 A.D.3d 930, 829 N.Y.S.2d 283 (3d Dept. 2007); Matter of Cody v. 
Dennison, 33 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 822 N.Y.S.2d 677 (3d Dept. 2006), lv. denied, 8 N.Y.3d 802, 
830 N.Y.S.2d 698 (2007), and the COMPAS instrument’s risk score, Matter of Dawes v. Annucci, 
122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 2014).   
      Nothing in the Board’s decision indicates a permanent denial of parole consideration. Hodge v 
Griffin, 2014 WL 2453333(SDNY 2014). 
     That the community opposition has erroneous information is once again baseless speculation. 
Submissions by private citizens are protected and remain confidential pursuant to 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 
8000.5(c)(2). Matter of Jordan v. Hammock, 86 A.D.2d 725, 447 N.Y.S.2d 44 (3d Dept. 1982); 
Matter of Murphy v. Annucci, Index No. 6736-16, Decision & Order dated July 31, 2017 (Sup. Ct. 
Albany Co.) (Raymond J.S.C.). An inmate has no constitutional right to the information in his 
parole file. Billiteri v U.S. Board of Parole, 541 F.2d 938, 944-945 (2d Cir. 1976). An inmate 
does not have automatic access to confidential material. Matter of Perez v New York State 
Division of Parole,  294 A.D.2d 726, 741 N.Y.S.2d 753 (3d Dept 2002);  Macklin v Travis, 274 
A.D.2d 821, 711 N.Y.S.2d 915, 916 (3d Dept. 2000).   Per Executive Law 259-i(2)(c)(B), items 
submitted to the Parole Board are deemed to be confidential. Per Executive Law 259-k(2) and 9 
N.Y.C.R.R. 8000.5(c)(2)(i)(a)(b), the Parole Board is entitled to designate certain parole records 
as confidential. Wade v Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1487, 52 N.Y.S.3d 508 (3d Dept. 2017) such that 
access to confidential documents may be denied. Justice v Commissioner of the New York State 
Department of Corrections and Community Supervision, 130 A.D.3d 1342, 15 N.Y.S.3d 853 (3d 
Dept. 2015). 
     An inmate has no Constitutional right to be conditionally released on parole before expiration 
of a valid sentence.  Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 
1, 99 S. Ct. 2100, 2104 (1979); Matter of Russo v. Bd. of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 
(1980); Matter of Vineski v. Travis, 244 A.D.2d 737, 664 N.Y.S.2d 391 (3d Dept. 1997).  The 
New York State parole scheme “holds out no more than a possibility of parole” and thus does not 
create a protected liberty interest implicating the due process clause.  Matter of Russo, 50 N.Y.2d 
at 75-76, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 985; see also Barna v. Travis, 239 F.3d 169, 171 (2d Cir. 2001); Matter 
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of Freeman v. New York State Div. of Parole, 21 A.D.3d 1174, 800 N.Y.S.2d 797 (3d Dept. 2005). 
That the inmate has served his minimum sentence does not give him a protected liberty interest in 
parole release.  Matter of Russo v. Bd. of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980); Matter 
of Warren v. New York State Div. of Parole, 307 A.D.2d 493, 493, 761 N.Y.S.2d 883, 883 (3d 
Dept. 2003); Matter of Vineski v. Travis, 244 A.D.2d 737, 664 N.Y.S.2d 391 (3d Dept. 1997). 
     Nothing in the due process clause requires the Parole Board to specify the particular evidence 
on which rests the discretionary determination an inmate is not ready for conditional release. 
Duemmel v Fischer, 368 Fed.Appx. 180, 182 (2d Cir. 2010). There is no due process requirement 
that the Parole Board disclose its release criteria.  Haymes v Regan, 525 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1975).    
The due process clause is not violated by the Board’s balancing of the statutory criteria, and which 
is not to be second guessed by the courts. Mathie v Dennison, 2007 WL 2351072 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); 
MacKenzie v Cunningham, 2014 WL 5089395 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
 
    Parole is not constitutionally based, but is a creature of statute which may be imposed subject to 
conditions imposed by the state legislature. Banks v Stanford, 159 A.D.3d 134, 71 N.Y.S.3d 515 
(2d Dept. 2018).   
    As for the Eighth Amendment, the denial of parole under a statute invoking discretion in parole 
determinations does not violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishment.  Carnes v. Engler, 76 Fed. Appx. 79 (6th Cir. 2003); Lustgarden v. Gunter, 966 F.2d 
552, 555 (10th Cir.), cert den. 506 U.S. 1008, 113 S. Ct. 624 (1992), rehearing denied 507 U.S. 
955, 113 S. Ct. 1374 (1993); Pacheco v. Pataki, No. 9:07–CV–0850, 2010 WL 3909354, at *3 
(N.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2010); Bressette v New York State Division of Parole, 2 F.Supp.2d 383, 387 
(W.D.N.Y. 1998).   
             Denial of parole is neither arbitrary nor capricious when the Parole Board relied on the 
factors defined by the New York statute. Hodge v Griffin, 2014 WL 2453333(S.D.N.Y. 2014) 
citing Romer v Travis, 2003 WL 21744079.  An arbitrary action is one without sound basis in 
reason and without regard to the facts. Rationality is what is reviewed under an arbitrary and 
capricious standard. Hamilton v New York State Division of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 
N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014). An action is arbitrary and capricious when it is taken without 
sound basis in reason or regard to the facts. Ward v City of Long Beach, 20 N.Y.3d 1042 (2013). 
Denial is neither arbitrary nor capricious when the Board relies on factors defined by New York 
statute.  Siao-Paul v. Connolly, 564 F. Supp. 2d 232, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
 
   The appellant/petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the Parole Board’s determination was 
affected by a showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety. Matter of Silmon v Travis, 95 
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N.Y.2d 470, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704 (2001); Matter of Russo v New York State Board of Parole, 50 
N.Y.2d 69, 77, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980). 
   In the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory 
factors, it must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty.  Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 
A.D.2d 914, 914, 680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); Matter of McLain v. New York State 
Div. of Parole, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); Matter of McKee v. New York 
State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); People ex rel. 
Herbert, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881. 
     Appellant’s claim that the Board failed to comply with the 2011 amendments to the Executive 
Law is rejected. Dolan v New York State Board of Parole, 122 A.D.3d 1058, 995 N.Y.S.2d 850 (3d 
Dept. 2014); Tran v Evans, 126 A.D.3d 1196, 3 N.Y.S.3d 633 (3d Dept. 2015); Boccadisi v Stanford, 
133 A.D.3d 1169, 20 N.Y.S.3d 477 (3d Dept. 2015). Furthermore, the 2011 Executive Law 
amendments have been incorporated into the regulations adopted by the Board in 2017. 
     The 2011 amendments to the Executive Law, as well as the state regulations governing parole, do 
not create a legitimate expectancy of release that would give rise to a due process interest in parole. 
Fuller v Evans, 586 Fed.Appx. 825 (2d Cir. 2014) cert.den. 135 S.Ct. 2807, 192 L.Ed2d 851. 
Parole is not constitutionally based, but is a creature of statute which may be imposed subject to 
conditions imposed by the state legislature. Banks v Stanford, 159 A.D.3d 134, 71 N.Y.S.3d 515 
(2d Dept. 2018). The 2017 amended regulations don’t create any substantive right to release, but 
rather, merely increase transparency in the final decision. Courts must defer to the Parole Board’s 
interpretation of its own regulations so long as it is rational and not arbitrary nor capricious. Brown 
v Stanford, 163 A.D.3d 1337, 82 N.Y.S.3d 622 (3d Dept. 2018). 
     Contrary to Appellant’s claim, the 2011 Amendment and amended 9 NYCRR § 8002.2(a) do 
not represent a forward-looking shift requiring the COMPAS to be the fundamental basis for 
release decisions.  This proposition is not supported by the language of the statute itself, 
considering the relatively modest change to Section 259-c(4) and the absence of any substantive 
change to Section 259-i(2), which governs the discretionary release consideration process.  In 
2011, the Executive Law was amended to require procedures incorporating risk and needs 
principles to “assist” the Board in making parole release decisions.  Executive Law § 259–c(4).  
The Board satisfies this requirement in part by using the COMPAS instrument.  Matter of Montane 
v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, 870 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of 
Hawthorne v. Stanford, 135 A.D.3d 1036, 1042, 22 N.Y.S.3d 640, 645 (3d Dept. 2016); Matter of 
LeGeros, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834; Matter of Robles v. Fischer, 117 A.D.3d 1558, 1559, 
985 N.Y.S.2d 386, 387 (4th Dept. 2014).  However, the COMPAS is not predictive and was never 
intended to be the sole indicator of risk and needs as the Board gets risk and needs information 
from a variety of sources, including the statutory factors and the interview.  Notably, the 2011 
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amendments did not eliminate the requirement that the Board conduct a case-by-case review of 
each inmate by considering the statutory factors, including the instant offense.  Executive Law 
§ 259-i(2)(c)(A); Matter of Montane, 116 A.D.3d at 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d at 870.  The amendments 
also did not change the three substantive standards that the Board is required to apply when 
deciding whether to grant parole.  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A).  Thus, the COMPAS 
instrument cannot mandate a particular result.  Matter of King, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815.  
Rather, the COMPAS is an additional consideration that the Board must weigh along with the 
statutory factors for the purposes of deciding whether all three statutory standards are satisfied.  
See Matter of Rivera v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 1108, 990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d 
Dept. 2014); accord Matter of Dawes v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 
2014); see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 
2017). Thus, even where the First Department has “take[n] the unusual step of affirming the 
annulment of a decision of [the Board]”, it has nonetheless reiterated that “[t]he Board is not 
obligated to refer to each factor, or to give every factor equal weight” and rejected any requirement 
that the Board prioritize “factors which emphasize forward thinking and planning over the other 
statutory factors”.  Matter of Rossakis v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 146 A.D.3d 22, 29 (1st 
Dept. 2016).   
 
    Amended 9 NYCRR § 8002.2(a) did not alter this approach.  Notice of Adoption, NY Reg, Sept. 
27, 2017 at 2 (reaffirming “any [risk and needs] instrument used is not dispositive”).  Indeed, the 
COMPAS does not (and cannot) supersede the Board’s authority to determine, based on members’ 
independent judgment and application of section 259-i(2)(c)(A)’s factors, whether an inmate should 
be released.  See 2011 N.Y. Laws ch. 62, § 1, part C, § 1, subpart A, § 1; Matter of Montane, 116 
A.D.3d at 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d at 870.  The amended regulation was intended to increase 
transparency in the Board’s decision making by providing an explanation if and when the Board 
departs from scales in denying an inmate release.  Notice of Adoption, NY Reg, Sept. 27, 2017 at 
2.   
 
    The Board decision did correctly depart from the COMPAS as the Board cited lack of remorse, 
and impact of the crime on the victim and his family, along with the deprecation standard.  
 
     In the absence of impropriety, the reconsideration date set by the Board will not be disturbed.   
Matter of Tatta v. State of N.Y., Div. of Parole, 290 A.D.2d 907, 908, 737 N.Y.S.2d 163 (3d Dept. 
2002); accord Matter of Evans v. Dennison, 13 Misc. 3d 1236(A), 831 N.Y.S.2d 353 (Sup. Ct. 
Westchester Co. 2006) (rejecting challenge to 24-month hold). 
 
Recommendation:  Affirm. 
